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Climate Change and State Death 
 
James Ker-Lindsay 







It is widely accepted that states can die. Through conquest, mergers and disintegration states 
have disappeared as political entities in the international system. In such cases, there are clear 
legal rules defining how the international community can and should respond. But what 
happens if a state ceases to meet the objective criteria of statehood, most notably by failing to 
have a defined territory? As is shown, there are no defined rules to manage such an 
eventuality. This is largely because it has never happened. However, processes of climate 
change mean that a number of atoll island states in the Pacific and Indian Oceans now face 
the real prospect of disappearing. In such circumstances, significant legal and political issues 
would arise. In addition to serious questions as to how to handle the displaced populations, 
there are also very important issues concerning the continuing recognition of such states and 
their place in international organisations. To this extent, if this option were to be pursued, 
there is a strong case to be made that it should be conducted in a collective framework. 
 





It is now generally understood that climate change poses a grave threat to international 
security.
1
 At the same time as rising temperatures will lead to droughts in large parts of 
Africa,
2
 many low-lying countries in Europe and Asia face the prospects of catastrophic 
flooding. This is likely to lead to massive population displacement, food shortages, resource 
competition and an increased risk of conflict.
3
 However, for one group of countries the effects 
of global warming will be nothing short of apocalyptic. According to its most recent 
estimates, published in 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
estimates that the oceans will rise between 26 and 82 centimetres by the end of this century.
4
 
This means that, in the decades to come, there is the very real chance that a number of island 
states in the Pacific and Indian Oceans will be completely submerged.
5
 At present, the four 




The possible disappearance of these countries poses very real challenges to international 
policy makers on several levels. First and foremost, there are serious questions about what 
will happen to the populations of these ‘sinking states’. Where will they live? What will be 
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their status? At the same time, it raises profound legal and political questions. As things stand, 
it is wholly unclear how the international community would handle the repercussions arising 
from the physical disappearance of these countries. In some instances, such uncertainty could 
well lead to territorial tensions and conflict. 
 
In large part, the problems arise because climate change presents us with hitherto unknown 
problems. While it is widely accepted that states can die, traditionally this has been 
understood as the loss of independent existence.
7
 A new state replaces the old. While states as 
political entities may come and go, the land on which they have existed has remained all but 
‘constant over the past millennium.’8 With climate change this will no longer be the case. We 
are now faced with the real possibility of the full and final extermination of a number of 
countries; not only as defined political units in the international system, but also as 
geographic entities on the world map. In view of the fact that traditional legal thinking 
maintains that without territory there can be no state, climate change raises entirely new 
questions. Indeed, it fundamentally challenges our traditional understanding of state death. 
While we know how to handle the legal and political consequences of state death in cases of 
military aggression, or when states decide to unite or collapse in on themselves, what happens 
when the very territory on which a state is located disappears and its settled inhabitants are 
forced to leave, thereby undermining the very conceptual foundations of statehood? Given 
that there have been no modern examples of countries that have become defunct through the 
complete and irreversible loss of their entire territory, there are no ready answers to these 
questions. 
 
While some observers have considered the implications of climate change and state death in 
the context of the of migration issues,
9
 or on the ways in which the state may be kept alive in 
some alternative form,
10
 the question of how one might address the extinction of ‘sinking 
states’, or ‘disappearing states’, as they have been termed, has largely been unexplored.11 This 
article seeks to address the problem of state death caused by climate change by considering 
the wider implications of state extinction and by exploring the specific processes involved in 
any effort to declare a country to be no longer existent following the complete loss of its 
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territory. As will be seen, the challenges posed such a situation not only relate to whether and 
how states could withdraw their recognition of a submerged state, but also raise questions 
concerning the termination of the membership of international organisations and steps for 
dealing with the remaining population of such a country. As will be seen, these would pose 
huge questions for the international community. 
 
 
Statehood and state death 
 
The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is widely considered to 
lay out the key formal characteristics of statehood.
12
 According to Article 1 of the 
Convention, ‘The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.’ 
 
Since they were first devised over eighty years ago, each qualification has been subject to 
further clarification. For instance, the requirement that a state should have a defined territory 
does not mean that its borders should be fixed in the final and definitive form at the time of 
recognition.
13
 A state may be recognised even if it is not in control of all the territory it views 
as its own.
14
 Likewise, while there is no argument over the condition that it should have a 
settled population, it is also accepted that the presence of a population in the territory 
concerned is not a sufficient condition in itself for statehood. Rather, it has come to be 
accepted that the political leadership of the new state should have come to power via some 
degree of ‘indigenous capability’ and that it ‘receives popular support’.15 Additionally, there 
is no specific minimum size – either in terms of land mass or population – for a state. Leaving 
aside the Vatican City, which holds a unique position in the international order of states, there 
are seven states that are less than 200 square kilometres in size and have a population under 
70,000 people.
16
 As for the demand that the state must have a government, this does not just 
mean that a state has an ability to administer its own affairs. It must be in a position whereby 
it is actually doing so. In other words, a state must truly be independent and not merely a 
‘puppet’ of another country or under de facto colonial rule.17 Finally, the qualification that an 
entity wishing to claim statehood must be capable of interacting with other states is no longer 
viewed as a characteristic solely limited to states.
18
 There are now a large number of entities 
and organisations that have, to some degree or another, the ability to enter into relations with 
states.
19
 Nevertheless, despite all these clarifications, the fact remains that any territory 
claiming statehood must have an effective and independent government, and with it an ability 
to enter into relations with other states, a settled population and a defined territory. 
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But what happens when any of these objective criteria of statehood cease to be met? While 
the nature of statehood and state creation has been subject to considerable investigation, 
rather less attention has been paid to the phenomenon of state death.
20
 This is largely because 
instances of extinction are in fact extremely rare in the contemporary era. Of the 207 states 
have ceased to exist since 1816, only nine have disappeared since 1945.
21
 Crucially, the few 
examples of state death in the modern era have exclusively related to a change in the 
objective conditions of government. They have not involved any material change to the 
population or territory of the country. As a result, the three broad forms of recognised state 




Of these three forms, conquest is now considered obsolete. International law now holds that 
external military aggression no longer results in the final extinction of a state.
23
 This was seen 
most obviously in the context of Iraq’s invasion and illegal annexation of Kuwait, in 1990. 
UN Resolution 662 stated, the ‘annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever 
pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void…[and called] upon all States, 
international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to 
refrain from any action or dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the 
annexation.’24 Instead, disintegration and merger are now the most usual forms of state death. 
In terms of the former, the most obvious examples are the dissolutions of the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. As for mergers, the most prominent cases 
over the past half-century or so have been the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar to 
form Tanzania (1964), the forcible union between North and South Vietnam (1975), the 
emergence of a united Germany (1990), and the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic and the 
Yemen People’s Republic (1990).25 
 
Importantly, in all these cases the process of so-called state death in fact amounted to a 
fundamental change to the sovereign authority governing a territory. The land itself, and its 
population, continued to exist. Instead, the political authorities exercising political control 
over the landmass and the population changed, whether by (temporary) conquest, dissolution 
or merger. To this end, the legal situation was therefore fairly well understood and governed 
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by existing principles of state succession, which addresses situations where sovereignty over a 




Matters become more complicated, however, when the discussion turns to the loss of effective 
loss of independent governance through internal disruption, or the complete loss of population 
or territory. Interestingly, it the case of the first of these, the loss of effective governance 
through internal disorder, this has not tended to result in state extinction in the modern era. 
One can readily highlight examples of countries that have little or no effective governance 
and yet have still been recognised as states by the international community,
27
 often for a 
considerable period of time. Perhaps the most obvious example has been Somalia, which 
disintegrated into a patchwork of fiefdoms in the 1990s.
28
 While Somalia ceased to be able to 
meet many of its duties and obligations, merely continuing to exist as ‘a shell of 
sovereignty’,29 no effort was made to declare it extinct and withdraw recognition. Indeed, it 
even maintained a presence at the UN, albeit a somewhat forlorn one.
30
 In such instances, the 
prevailing presumption is that any loss of government in such cases is temporary and that, 
‘the temporary ineffectiveness or absence of a government...does not affect statehood.’31 
 
On the other hand, the complete loss of population would potentially pose a far more serious 
challenge to the continuing existence of a state. However, such a situation would seem to be 
highly unlikely in itself. One obvious way this could happen would be a natural disaster 
requiring complete evacuation. Although it is theoretically possible that this could occur, 
there are no recorded cases in the modern era.
32
 Disasters aside, in cases where the territory of 
the state remained intact, the prospect of state extinction due to the absence of a population 
appears to be extremely remote. For a start, the levels at which a state would become 
unsustainable appear to be very low, both in terms of population density as well as absolute 
population size. For example, Mongolia, the country with the current lowest density of any 
country, has 2 inhabitants per square kilometre. Meanwhile, Australia, Iceland, Libya, 
Namibia and Suriname all exist with 3 inhabitants per square kilometre.
33
 More to the point, 
even where there is a population decline amongst the current indigenous population, there 
may well be steps taken to encourage immigration to counteract the demographic changes.
34
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In the worst case scenario, and again where there is no physical loss of territory, the more 
likely form of state death would most probably be some form of political union with a 
neighbouring state. Of course, if this were to happen, the international community would 
again be dealing with a traditional form of state death through merger. This would pose 
relatively few legal or political complications.  
 
In contrast to the rather unlikely case of a state losing all of its population, but retaining its 
territory, the actual loss of the entire land mass of a country poses a far more fundamental and 
realistic challenge to statehood. The prevailing view in amongst international lawyers is that 
without territory there can be no state.
35
 However, as with the example of depopulation, it is 
also a hitherto unknown event. There has not been a single example in modern history where 
the entire territory of a state has disappeared.
36
 States may come and go as political entities. 
However, despite occasionally gaining or losing tracts of land through earthquakes or 
volcanic activity, the territory on which they have been constituted has remained a constant of 
the geography of the modern world. Indeed, as has been noted, ‘International law has 
assumed territory will always exist’.37 And yet there is now a very clear danger that the 
complete loss of territory may now occur as a result of climate change. With rising sea levels 
there is a very real prospect that a number of states could be wholly submerged. Given that 
the loss of territory would necessarily also be accompanied by the loss of a settled population, 
thereby compounding the situation,
38
 it seems almost impossible to conceive of the continued 
existence of a state under such extraordinary circumstances. Indeed, as one observer has put 
it, ‘the argument is so obvious as to be unnecessary. That a State would cease to exist if for 
instance the whole of its population were to perish or to emigrate, or if its territory were to 
disappear (e.g. an island which would become submerged).’39 
 
 
Alternatives to climate change related state death 
 
In view of the very real danger that they may be submerged within the next half century, the 
countries most at threat have already started to examine the ways in which to avoid 
extinction.
40
 One of the most interesting, and widely cited, options on the table is the 
possibility of creating artificial islands that could be used to house the population and thus 
retain a physical presence on a defined piece of territory.
41
 This is already being explored by 
Kiribati.
42
 Meanwhile, other related suggestions are also being considered. These include 
building houses on piles above the sea or even maintain a small population in some form of 
placeholder construction, such as a lighthouse, that is specifically built to be a ‘sovereignty 
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marker’. While these are certainly interesting possibilities, whether these measures would be 




Meanwhile, a range of other ideas have also been mooted. Another option is the possibility of 
moving the state to a new territory purchased from, or ceded by, another state.
44
 For example, 
the Maldives at one point suggested that it would seek to establish a sovereign wealth fund to 
buy land in Sri Lanka, India or Australia.
45
 More recently, Kiribati has purchased land in 
Fiji.
46
 However, this option also faces significant shortcomings. As has been noted, ‘it is 
difficult to envisage any state now agreeing, no matter what the price, to cede a portion of its 
territory to another state unless that territory is uninhabited, uninhabitable, not subject to any 
property, personal, cultural or other claims, and devoid of all resources and any value 
whatsoever to the ceding state.’47 Certainly, the option of land purchase seems to have little 
support amongst existing states thus far. The idea received short-shrift from Australia and 
New Zealand when suggested by Tuvalu in 2001.
48
 Of course, this may well change as the 
possibility of extinction becomes more likely. 
 
An alternative suggestion is for the disappearing state to try to pursue a merger with another 
state, perhaps in the form of a federation or confederation.
49
 In return for accommodating its 
population, the state may be able to bring with it certain territorial advantages, such as its 
ongoing claim to territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
50
 
While this would certainly be a rather more traditional form of state death, and could 
presumably be fairly easily accommodated, the problem is that the legal situation would by no 
means be certain. Indeed, it could quite possibly be challenged, either legally or militarily, by 
neighbouring states.  
 
Meanwhile, a rather more radical option that has been suggested is to investigate the 
possibility for some form of deterritorialised statehood.
51
 Although this runs against the 
accepted wisdom of the Montevideo Criteria, advocates of this options have pointed to two 
recedents for such an incongruous state of affairs. The Vatican existed as a deterritorialised 
sovereign state from 1870 until it was ceded territory in Rome in 1929. Another commonly 
cited example is the Sovereign Order of Malta.
52
 In truth, neither model looks realistic. As 
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noted, the Vatican is widely regarded as a rather special case in international politics. And 
while the Order of Malta may be a curious example of sovereignty without territory, although 
it has an international personality it is not in fact considered to be a state.
53
 Nevertheless, 
other forms of statehood without territory could potentially be devised with sufficient political 
will. For example, one model that has been presented envisages a form of ‘ex-situ 





Finally, the international community could simply continue to act as though the state 
continues, even though the government no longer has any formal and effective control over its 
territory.
55
 Clearly, there is a precedent for this. As seen, states have continued to exist even 
through they do not have an effective government, notably through processes of invasion and 
occupation. In such instances, international law ‘artificially constructs the continuation of the 
state’.56 It may well be possible that the international community would somehow decide to 
adapt this precedent for use in the event that states do find themselves affected by climate 
change. Indeed, it has even been suggested that states have a moral duty to continue to 
recognise islands that have been submerged as a result of manmade climate change.
57
 The 
question is whether this could really be a permanent state of affairs. While it is possible sea-
levels may again drop, and allow the territory to be reclaimed, this would seem an unlikely 
outcome in anything other than the very long term. In view of this, ongoing 
‘recognition…cannot create a situation that does not in fact exist: the continuity of a state 
cannot rest on recognition alone’.58 Others have therefore suggested that this approach could 
be a stop gap measure that could be adopted for, say, 30-100 years.
59
 This would allow time 
to ‘resolve uncertainties as to status and allow for new situations to be regularized’.60 
 
 
The challenges of climate change-related state death  
 
Even if a temporary solution could be established, it would seem all but inevitable that at 
some point the status of the submerged country would have to be addressed. After a certain 
period of time, the international community would surely have to accept that the state in 
question has not only ceased to meet the Montevideo Criteria, but that it has no realistic 
chance of resurrection. Interestingly, however, this option has barely been considered so far. 
In most of the academic literature, it hardly merits a mention. Likewise, officials also seem to 
have ignored this option. Certainly, it has not been discussed openly or privately by the 
British government.
61
 Even though Kiribati, the Maldives and Tuvalu are all former British 
colonies and members of the Commonwealth of Nations, and London has taken a very close 
interest in the effects of climate change on these states, the United Kingdom has never 
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seriously considered this matter.
62
 Neither has the issue been given serious thought by United 




The general reluctance to engage with the issue may well stem from the fact that it seems to 
be a long way off. This would appear to leave plenty of time for the other options to be 
explored. However, it may also be a result of the awareness of the huge problems that would 
arise if this uncharted route were to be followed. 
 
First and foremost, there are major political implications to consider. Any state facing 
extinction would in all probability ‘fight to the bitter end before surrendering their 
sovereignty’.64 Likewise, many other states, especially others that could be affected by 
climate change, would almost certainly be strongly opposed to any moves to accept the 
principle that states could be deemed to have become extinct and their sovereign rights 
annulled. Other countries may have their own individual reasons to oppose such a drastic 
course of action. For instance, Britain and the United States could well be particularly 
reluctant to allow this to happen due to their special ties to these states. Meanwhile, in 
contrast, some countries, especially neighbouring states, may well have a particular incentive 
to withdraw recognition. One obvious reason may be to lay claim to maritime zones. This 
could potentially lead to competing territorial claims. This could in turn lead to conflict. If 
nothing else, differences of opinion on the question of withdrawing recognition could well 
give rise to an anomalous situation whereby some countries continue to recognise the state, 
whereas others do not. Although this is admittedly less of a strange occurrence in the 
contemporary era than it once was, the potential for confusion and instability is apparent. 
 
Then there are the tricky legal questions that would arise. As noted, in all previous cases of 
state death the territory has remained intact. Consequently, international law has evolved to 
think of state death within this framework. As has been said, ‘when a state is deprived of its 
independence and of its territory, these do not vanish into a legal vacuum. They are acquired 
by another State or by a number of States which have arisen on what was formerly its 
territory.’65 However, when an island disappears beneath the waves there would be no process 
of acquisition. The international community would necessarily be confronted with such a 
‘legal vacuum’. At conceptual level, it is entirely unclear how it should respond. On the key 
question of recognition, there is simply no consensus as to whether, let alone how, it could 
happen. Some scholars have taken the view that, once granted, recognition cannot be 
rescinded.
66
 In contrast, others have argued that it should be possible when the objective 
conditions of recognition no longer exist.
67
 Still others contend that no formal process would 
actually be necessary. Once a state ceased to meet the criteria of statehood, it would 
automatically cease to be a state.
68
 No further action would need to be taken. 
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While it may be theoretically possible to do nothing, in reality the situation this seems 
unfeasible. Unlike recognition, which usually represents the beginning of a formal 
relationship,
69
 and thus presents a clean slate on which to build ties, the withdrawal of 
recognition would mark the termination of a relationship. There would necessarily be any 
number of loose ends that would need to be addressed. To this extent, it would therefore seem 
all but certain that it would have to be formally announced in some manner. Again, however, 
there is no precedent for this. Conceivably, one could modify the recognition process.
70
 Under 
usual circumstances, a state recognising another state will announce its decision through a 
statement or press release. Alternatively, it will communicate its intention to the state in 




Even if this relatively trifling problem of communicating a decision to withdraw recognition 
could be overcome, it would merely mark the start of a far bigger set of issues. There would 
be any number of very important practical matters that would have to be managed. For 
instance, one very immediate and obvious problem would be the question of how to deal with 
the embassy and associated diplomatic staff of the extinct state. It seems unrealistic to 
suppose that one day an embassy is recognised, and the next its staff are no longer accorded 
diplomatic immunity and it simply stops receiving invitations to official receptions. 
Additionally, there would be issues relating to official state property, such as the embassy 
itself, or state holdings that may be held in the country.  
 
Aside from the bilateral problems that would arise, there would also be a range of questions 
thrown up at the multilateral level. For a start, what would happen to the country’s 
membership of various international organisations. Again, this presents a range of legal and 
political problems. The constitutions of most international and regional bodies appear to make 
no provision for rescinding membership.
72
 Even the Pacific Island Forum, which faces the 
extinction of at least three members, makes no mention of such a process.
73
 Again, the 
anomaly of a state still remaining a member of one organisation but not another would create 
problems and uncertainties. What would happen, for example, if the PIF decided to maintain 
the membership of several extinct states, but then tried to enter into an agreement with 
another organisation that does not? This could create no end of legal complications. 
 
Such concerns would be most acute in terms of the United Nations. While the UN cannot 
recognise states,
74
 membership is nevertheless seen to have an important legitimising effect. 
Indeed, it is widely understood to mark a state’s general, though not necessarily universal, 
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acceptance within the international community of states.
75
 Crucially, membership of the 
United Nations and its associated bodies is also linked to the process of securing many of the 
internationally accepted trapping of statehood.
76
 Just to give one example, membership of the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) gives a state a telephone dialling code. Then 
there are a range of other practical matters that would need to be resolved. For instance, 
decisions would have to be made as to how to manage the funds or any other assets released 
by the effective termination of membership of international organisations. If joining the UN 
means ‘hooking up with the international system’s buried wiring’,77 then presumably leaving 
would mark require untangling a defunct entity from that mass of cables.
78
 A decision to 
remove a state from the UN and associated organisations could therefore have important 
wider ramifications in terms of its symbolic standing as a state.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, in any bilateral or multilateral process leading to the final 
acceptance of the extinction of these states, serious consideration would have to be given to 
the remaining population. Already, we have started to see major demographic changes as a 
result of climate change. For example, it is reported that a quarter of the population of Kiribati 
have already had to move due to the impact of environmental change.
79
 In some instances, 
people are moving from islands and atolls that have become uninhabitable to those that can 
still support people, at least for the meantime. However, many are already moving to new 
countries.
80
 In the decades that will come this will increase. Indeed, almost everyone will 
have had to have fled long before the waves subsume the last piece of land. But what status 
will they have? Currently, people fleeing climate change are not considered to be refugees,
81
 
with all the rights associated with this status.
82
 Their situation would have to be carefully 
considered. In many instances, it seems likely that they will acquire new citizenship. 
However, this cannot be guaranteed. Unless effective remedies are devised, there is the 
possibility that many people will be rendered stateless.
83
 Even decisions by individual states 
to withdraw recognition could have enormous implications for any nationals of the extinct 
state residing in their territory. For example, would their passports cease to be recognised?
84
 
And what would happen if they require consular assistance? Any effort to declare a state 
extinct would inevitable have a huge human dimension that would need to be addressed. 
 
 
Towards a UN process for managing state death? 
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As seen, state death in the context of climate change clearly poses a diverse range of complex 
and hitherto unprecedented political, legal, economic and social questions. There is plenty of 
scope for turmoil, if not conflict, if states and organisations are simply left to pursue their 
individual policies. For this reason, there would seem to be a strong, if not compelling, case to 
be made for developing a single, global mechanism for managing state extinction.
85
 Perhaps 
the most obvious option would be for the matter to be managed by the United Nations. 
Specifically, one idea that would seem to stand out would be to return to a problem raised a 
little earlier and explore the option of using a mechanism for terminating UN membership as 
a universal mechanism for managing state death. The clear advantage of such a system is that 
once completed it would allow individual states to engage in a process of controlled 
withdrawal of recognition. 
 
The problem is that, at present, there is no provision within the Charter for revoking 
membership for states that no longer exist. The closest the Charter comes to such a 
mechanism is a process of expulsion, under Article 6, for states that persistently violate the 
UN’s principles. Nevertheless, as one UN official noted, this could conceivably form the 
basis for a process of removal; albeit ‘without the persistent violations of the UN Charter’.86 
Although this has never been used to expel a state, a form of it was used in the case of 
Taiwan, which was replaced in the UN following a vote in the General Assembly in October 
1971 that admitted the People’s Republic of China in its place.87 According to the Charter, 
this process would operate in a manner similar the process of membership. The General 




The key question is how the Security Council would decide to make such a recommendation 
in the first place. It would require the acquiescence of the five permanent members. While it 
may well be the case that by the time the idea is pursued there will be a general consensus on 
the need for such a mechanism, it is also possible that some members will remain highly 
reluctant to accept such a step. In such a situation, perhaps the most obvious answer would be 
for the Security Council, or even the General Assembly, to ask for an advisory opinion from 
the International Court of Justice.
89
 In doing so, the request could be made either for a 
judgment on the objective fact of the continued existence of the state in question, or on the 
specific obligations of states towards the remaining authorities of a state that no longer meets 




While an advisory opinion would certainly help to set the legal stage for a decision on 
membership, it would still leave open a number of practical issues. For this reason, it would 
seem likely that before taking a final decision on withdrawing recognition, the Security 
Council would have to establish some sort of mechanism, be it a conference or an 
international committee, to decide on specific aspects arising from the withdrawal of 
recognition. This could address a range of specific issues, such as the distribution of state 
assets and questions of territorial claims. Only once the various issues arising from any 
decision to revoke the membership of the state had been decided would the Security Council 
then pass the necessary resolution recommending the termination of membership. At this 
point, the General Assembly could then have the final say on the matter. The advantage of 
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such a process would be that once a suitable resolution has been passed by the UN, the way 
would be open for states and other regional and international organisations to follow through 
with individual or collective processes of derecognition, or withdrawal of membership. 
 
Although there may be merit to such a route, such an approach could well face strong 
opposition. Quite apart from the likely objections from states also facing extinction, it could 
also be challenged by some states as an unacceptable infringement on their sovereignty. Many 
countries, not least of all the United States, regard recognition as a sovereign prerogative. Just 
as the idea of collective recognition being undertaken by the UN as a whole was dismissed 
during the drafting of the UN Charter on the grounds that it amounted to an unacceptable 
infringement of the fundamental sovereign prerogative of states to recognise other states,
91
 so 
it could well be the case that many countries would want to block any attempt to lay the 
foundations for the collective withdrawal of recognition for the same reasons. Nevertheless, 
despite the drawbacks, a mechanism for the controlled withdrawal of recognition would seem 
to present a far better way to minimise the prospects for conflict than a free-for-all approach 





Climate change poses a very real threat to the continued existence of a number of states. As 
Frank Bainimarama, the Prime Minister of Fiji put it at the start of climate change summit in 
November 2015, ‘Unless the world acts decisively in the coming weeks to begin addressing 
the greatest challenge of our age, then the Pacific, as we know it, is doomed.’92 This has also 
been echoed by President Anote Tong of Kiribati, who has noted that, ‘the science continues 
to indicate that we will continue to go under water within the century.’93 The physical 
disappearance of countries would raise complex questions. While the concept of state death is 
widely accepted, this has almost exclusively been understood in the context of the passing of 
control over a piece of territory from one state to another by the processes of conquest, 
merger or dissolution. In such cases, the legal and political mechanisms for managing the 
situation are well established. However, in the event of the loss of the physical territory, 
coupled with the displacement of the population, the steps that would need to be taken are 
unclear. Should it come to pass, it would quite simply be an unprecedented situation that has 
never been encountered, and thus seriously considered, in international law. 
 
It is perhaps for this reason that attention has so far been focused on strategies for state 
survival. At present, these are primarily focused on land reclamation or the creation of 
artificial islands, the possibility of establishing the state on the territory of another country or 
some other form of merger, or, more radically, on some form of deterritorialised statehood. 
Alternatively, some have suggested that it may simply be a case of maintaining the fiction 
that the state survives. While each of these ideas are certainly options to consider, ultimately 
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any decision will have to be based on a wider discussion of the implications of each 




Despite the best efforts to try to keep these countries functioning, even as a legal fiction, it 
may well be the case that a formal process of terminating their place in the international 
community of states will be needed. As shown, the international community would be on 
wholly unexplored ground. Such an option has certainly not been considered by policy 
makers. This would seem to be for several reasons. For a start, there are a range of complex 
legal issues that would need to be settled. There are no precedents for rescinding recognition. 
While it seems certain that it could be done, it is unclear how it could happen. The same 
applies for the loss of membership in international organisations. Meanwhile, at a political 
level, any move to open up debate on the subject could be highly destabilising. While many 
states would inevitably be firmly opposed to the idea, there would be others that would see it 
as an opportunity to capitalise on the situation. This could even lead to conflict. Finally, there 
is the crucial question of what would happen to the citizens of these countries. Whatever 
decision is taken, their welfare would have to be placed front and centre of any debates. For 
all these reasons, there is a good case to be made for considering some formal multilateral 
mechanism to oversee the process, perhaps as a process that would mirror the admittance to 
the United Nations. This could even incorporate a decision by the International Court of 
Justice, which could consider the wider factors. However, even this model, which would be 
designed to minimise conflict, is likely to meet resistance. States may not wish to set in place 
a mechanism that allows for the demise of one of their number to be addressed in a formal 
multilateral manner, thereby undermining their sovereign right to handle recognition issues. 
 
In reality, the possibility of authorised state death therefore seems highly unlikely for the 
foreseeable future. It still seems more probable that every effort will be made to prolong their 
existence, not least of because there tends to be be presumption in favour of the continuity of 
states.
95
 However, even if the withdrawal of recognition by states and the expulsion from 
international organisations is a step too far from our current vantage point, the fact 
nevertheless remains that serious thought needs to be given to managing the range of complex 
issues inevitably arising from the complete and seemingly irreversible disappearance of a 
state as a physical entity. Although this has hitherto been an unknown occurrence in modern 
international affairs, climate change means that we could be facing the prospect of sunken 
territories that no longer objectively qualify as states. 
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